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VER the past fouryears, thestubborn strength of
the U.S. dollar in foreigncurrency markets has created
what many observers believe is a precar’ious balance
between two undesirable features of the floating ex-
change rate system. Onthe one hand, some argue that
the dollar’ is overvalued and, consequently, soon will
fall dramatically, generating increased U.S. inflation
andjeopardizing world financial stability. Onthe other
hand, other-s asgue that the “high” dollar was amajor
cause of the 1981—82 economic recession and now
assert that the cur-rent expansion is not sustainable
without a substantial decline in the foreign exchange
value of the dollar.’
Surpsisingly, both sets of dollar critics have ad-
vanced the same policy prescription: intervene in fos-
eign exchange mas-kets. In other- words, the monetary
Dallas S. Batten and Mack Ott aresenioreconomistsatthe Federal
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‘For examples, consider Kraus (1984), Arenson (1984) and Bank for
International Settlements (1984). In the last (p. 1), Dr. Gleske, a
member of the Directorate of the Deutsche Bundesbank,was some-
what bemused by the dollar’s persistent high value:
There therefore seem to be enough reasons to support expectations
that the dollar rate will decline. However, contrary to all historical experi’
ence, these expectations have not been fulfilled as yet. The markets do
not seem to have any expectations of this nature, either. Apparently,
investing in dollar assets — especially in the united States itself —
continues to be lucrative despite the greaterexchange rate risk, and the
markets appear up to now to have hardly any doubts that the dollar will
remain attractive despite the tact that the fundamental factors like the
declining competitiveness of U.S. industry and sharply rising current-
account deficits operate rather in Savour ot expecting the opposite.
authorities of the United States and its major trading
partners should buy and sell foreign currencies. The
first set of critics urges this policy to manage thefall of
the dollar’s foreign exchange value, while the second
urges it to bringdown the value ofthe dollar in order to
stimulate the U.S. traded goods sectors.2
The purpose of this paper is to explain the fun-
damentals of cents-al bank intervention in foreign ex-
change mam-ketsand theconditions required for itto be
effective. First, the motives, mechanics and conse-
quences of intervention are discussed. Next, the rela-
tionship between intervention and domestic monetary
policy is investigated. Finally, some qualitative and
quantitative evidence on the efficacy of intervention is
reviewed.
WHY CENTRAL BANKS INTERVENE
The exchange rate is the price of one country’s cur-
mency in terms of another. As the relative price of two
assets (currencies), it is determined by the fos-ces of
demand and supply, as are the prices of other assets,
‘Traded goods are those goods that are potentially exportable or
importable — whether or not they are actually oonsumed domestical-
ly or abroad. For instance, agricultural commodities, airplanes and
steel are tradedgoods, while haircuts, legal servicesand housing are
primarily nontraded goods. The importance of the distinction be-
tween traded and nontradedgoods is that changes in foreign com-
petition will directly affect production and sates both in the home and
foreign markets in the traded goods sector, while only indirectly
affecting produotion and sales in the nontraded goods sector.
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such as stocks, bonds or real estate.3 Moreover, the
relative valuations of and yields on non-currency
assets also have, as we shall see, large impacts on the
exchange rate.
Unlike the prices of services or nondurable goods,
asset prices reflect primarily the market’s expectations
about future economic conditions. Consequently, in
the short run, exchange rates should be influenced
predominantly by newinformation — that is, surprises
— which alters expectations of future events; these
surprises lead to highly unpredictable and often siz-
able movements in exchange rates. Because news can
be incorrect and because markets can oyerreact to
news even when it is correct, monetary authorities
typically believe that much ofthe short-run volatility
exhibited by foreign exchange markets is excessive.4
Consequently, intervention is frequently rationalized
by central banks as a means to reduce the presumed
excessive variability of exchange rate movements re-
sulting from the variability of market expectations.5
In the long run, movements of exchange rates tend
toward arelationship among currencies known as pur-
chasing power parity (PPP). That is, a dollar oryen or
deutsche mar-k 1DM) would each purchase the same
amount of goods whether expended at home or
abroad. Thus, acountry with arelatively rapid inflation
rate will have its currency decline in value relative to
the currencies ofcountries with slowerinflation rates.
Ignoring long-run considerations, frequent and
offsetting exchange rate movements in the shor’t or
‘Policymakers sometimes argue that it is too important to be deter-
minedsolely bymarket forces. Consider, for example, the view of Dr.
Otmar Emminger,former Presidentof the Deutsche Bundesbank,as
expressed in a speechto a Bankers’ Forum at Georgetown Universi-
ty, Washington, D.C., on September 28, 1981 (see Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements [1982], p. 4):
Theexchange rate is tar too important a price — because of its effects
on domestic stability and activity, the balanceof payments, and interna-
tional trade and payments relations —tobetreatedwith ‘benignneglect’
as a ‘residual outcome’ of domestic monetary and other economic
policies. This should not be misunderstood as a call for activism and
interventionism in the field of exchange rates, It cannot beemphasised
too much that the most important foundation for exchange rate stability
is a policy of monetary and financial stability at home. We would,
however, delude ourselves it we believed that all that is required for
stable exchange ratesis the pursuit of a steady money supply policy.
Short and medium-term strains and disturbances are built-in elements
in the field of payments and exchange markets, even if we had firm
international agreement and successful implementation of concerted
money supply policies.
4
This concern, however, appears to be misdirected as Bergstrand
(1983)has demonstratedthat exchangerates are actually less vari-
able than other asset prices.
5
Foradditionalsupportforthischaracterization, see Kubarych (1983),
pp. 16—19 and 43—45.
intermediate term can be more than just anuisance to
monetary authorities—they also can have realeffects.
For example, an appreciation of the exchange rate
beyond that necessary to offset theinflation differential
between two countries (termed “overshooting”) raises
the price of traded goods in the home country relative
to the prices of traded goods in the rest of the world.
Thus, home country exports become less competitive
inworld markets and home country import substitutes
less competitive in domestic markets. Consequently,
sales of traded goods decline, generating unemploy-
ment in the traded goods sector and, subsequently,
inducing a shift of resources from the traded to the
nontraded goods sector.
This reallocation of resources is efficient for the
economy ifthat portion ofthe exchange rate apprecia-
tion in excess ofthe inflation differential is permanent.
Ifthis excess portion ofthe exchange rate appreciation
is short-lived i.e., reversed in the near futurel, the
corresponding movement of resources will be re-
versed, and the economy will have experienced un-
necessary unemployment due to the costs of shifting
resources, reallocating capital, laying off and hiring.
Monetary authorities who wish to avoid such situa-
tions may intervene to oppose exchange rate move-
ments that they believe will riot persist. This is a fea-
sible policy, however, oni if they can distinguish
temporary exchange rate fluctuations from permanent
ones.°
Exchange rate changes also affect the general price
level and may gener-ate some measured short-run in-
flation or-disinflation as markets adjust to the changing
relative price of traded to nontraded goods. In particu-
lar, an exchange s-atedepreciation raises the domestic
currency pt-ice ofimports and, thus, raises the domes-
tic pricelevel.Because thetotal impact ofthis change is
not felt all at once, the price level continues to rise for
some time. Thus, since exchange rate depreciation
usually precedes changes in domestic prices, it may
appear to cause inflation.’
6
This distinction is difficult to make in practice. As Martin Feldstein
(1983), p. 48, observed:
[Tlhere isno way in practiceto distinguish anexchange-rate movement
that is merely a random fluctuation from one that is part of a fundamental
shift in the equilibrium exchange rate, Exchange-market intervention
aimedat smoothing a transitorydisturbance may infactbea counterpro-
ductive or futile attempt to prevent a basic shift in the equilibrium ex-
change rate.
Furthermore, thisovershooting may 000ur because asset markets
clear more rapidlythan dogoods markets, and, asa result, it may not
be undesirable.
‘For a more detailed discussion ofthe relationship between domestic
inflation and exchange rate changes, see Batten and Ott (1983).
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Finally, many domestic residents, firms and, espe-
cially, multinational corporations have financial assets
and liabilities denominated in foreign currencies. Ex-
change rate changes, then, produce wealth effects
sincethey generate capital losses and gains. For exam-
ple,ifthe U.S. exchange rate unexpectedly appreciates,
the dollar values of foreign-currency-denominated
assets and liabilities fall. Hence, U.S. net monetary
debtors in foreign currencies experience gains, and net
creditors experience losses?
In sum, changes in exchange rates have conse-
quences that monetary authorities may deem unde-
sirable. Thus, having chosen not to allow exchange
rates to be completely market-determined, many cen-
tral banks intervene periodically in foreign exchange
markets to mitigate what they believe to be transient
but deleterious effects ofexchange rate movements on
the domestic economy.
HOW CENTRAL BANKS INTERVENE
The mechanics of central bank intervention in for-
eignexchange markets can take avariety offorms. The
general purpose of each variant, however, is basically
the same:augment the market demand forone curren-
cy by augmenting the market supply of another. An
exhaustive explanation of the ways in which interven-
tion can be conducted is beyond the scope of this
paper? Instead, we will describe the most ftequently
eA net monetary foreign currency debtor is an individual or firm with
greater monetary debts than monetary claims in a foreign currency.
Thus, when that foreign currency depreciates, his foreign liabilities
decline in value more than his foreign assets, and, on net, his wealth
rises. Similarly, a foreign currency depreciation would lower the
wealth of a net monetary foreign currency creditor.
°SeeBaibach (1978) for a detailed analysis of various forms of in-
tervention.
employed method — intervention by the monetary
authority.
it Typical Example
Suppose that the dollar is believed to be overvalued.
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which acts as
the agent for U.S. foreign exchange market interven-
tions, will purchase foreign currency, typically PM,
with U.S. dollars.1°It can do this simply by creating
dollar reserves and using them to purchase PM. In
particular, the Fedcan purchase PM-denominated de-
posits of U.S. banks at German banks and pay for them
by crediting the reserve accounts of these U.S. banks.
The Fedthen presents to theBundesbank drafts drawn
against accounts of these U.S. banks at German banks,
which are subsequently cleared by the Bundesbank.
The impact of this transaction on the financial institu-
tions involved is outlined in figure 1. In gener-al, the
reserves of the U.S. banking system increase, while
those of the German banking system fall. The changes
in the reserve positions of the United States and Ger-
many that result from this foreignexchange operation
will cause the U.S. money stock to rise and Germany’s
money stock to fall.
Conversely, if the Bundesbank believes the PM to
be undervalued (i.e., the dollar- is overvalued), it could
reduce the quantity of PM relative to dollars. This
transaction is slightly more complicated than when
the Fed intervenes in support of the PM. First, the
Bundesbank must acquir-e dollars. It typically does this
either by selling some of its non-negotiable U.S. Trea-
sury securities to the Fed or by borm-owing from the
‘°In the United States, the Federal ReserveBank of New York inter-
venes for the Federal Reserve System and the U.S. Treasury. The
decision to intervene, however, is made by the U.S. Treasury.
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Fed in exchange for a dollar-denominated account
through a swap arrangement already established be-
tween thetwo.These acquired dollars are then used to
buy PM in the foreign exchange market.
In figure 2, step 1 depicts the acquisition by the
Bundesbank of a dollar--denominated deposit at the
Fed. Since this tr-ansaction is between central banks, it
does not affect the reserves of the banking system in
either country and, hence, does not affecteither- coun-
tsy’s domestic money supply. In step 2, the Bund-
esbank purchases PM-denominated deposits of U.S.
commercial banks held at German commercial banks
with dollars. This transaction is cleared by U.S. banks
presenting to the Fed dollar-denominated claims
against the Bundesbank and receiving reserves in re-
turn. (At the same time, the Fed reduces its deposit
liabilities to the Bundesbank.) Likewise, the Bund-
esbank clear’sthe draftit purchased from U.S. banks by
lowering its reserve liabilities to Get-man banks. And
finally, German banks, presented with a draft against
deposits ofU.S. banks, r-educe their deposit liabilities to
these banks by the amount of the reduction in their
reserve deposits at the Bundesbank. The final result is
the same as in the preceding case — the r-eserves ofthe
U.S. banking system rise, while those in the German
banking system fall.
Sterilized vs~Unsterilized Intervention
The two examples discussed above are instances of
unsterilized intervention; that is, the domestic money
supplies have not been insulated from the foreign ex-
change market transaction. Ifunsterilized intervention
is undertaken in large amounts, it will affect not only
the money supplies of both countries, but domestic
prices and interest rates as well. If monetary author-
ities do not want their foreign exchange market in-
tervention to affect their domestic economies, they
may sterilize its impact with an offsetting sale or
purchase of domestic assets
Sterilized intervention would be the preferred pro-
cedure if the Fed did not want the U.S. banking sys-
tem’s reserves to change. Thus, if the unsterilized
intervention interfered with the goals of domestic
monetary policy, the Fed could sell US. Treasury
securities in U.S.financial markets equal to theamount
ofreserves created by the intervention. With this trans-
action, the level of reserves in the U.S. banking system
would return to its preintervention level, and, as a
result, there would be no subsequent change in the
U.S. money supply.
Similarly, the Bundesbank could neutralize the im-
pact of intervention on the German money supply by
injecting new reserves into its banking system. Ifsteril-
ized completely, the foreign exchange operation
would not affect either country’s money supply. Thus,
in the case of a completely sterilized intervention,
private portfolios would contain fewer PM-
denominated securities and more dollar-denominated
securities, while the Fed’s portfolio would contain





Exchange rate movements reflect two fundamental
characteristics that must be recognized to understand
the impact of intervention. First, changes in exchange
rates, like changes in the price of anyasset, are highly
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irregular and unpredictable in the short run, reflecting
primarily new events that alter the market’s expecta-
tions of future exchange rate movements. Second,
since the exchange rate is the relative price of two
currencies, its movements reflect changes in policies
that affect either the supplies ofthese currencies orthe
demands to hold them. More specifically, exchange
rates reflect anticipated relative inflation rates that are
generated by both past and expected future policy
actions ofthe countries involved.Therefore, currencies
of countries with lower expected inflation rates are
cheaper to hold and are in greater demand than those
ofcountries with higher inflation rates, all other things
equal. Consequently, it follows from PIt that curren-
cies of higher-inflation countries tend to depreciate
relative to those oflower-inflation countries.
The different impacts of sterilized and unsterilized
intervention on the exchange rate can be analyzed in
terms of these two characteristics. Suppose, as out-
lined above, that either the Fed or the Bundesbank
purchases PM with U.S. dollars. This transaction in-
creases the short-run flow demand for PM relative to
the supply of PM and should result in an appreciation
of the PM, all other things equal. This impact will be
only transitory, however, unless the central bank con-
tinues to purchase PM day afterday, ther-eby maintain-
ing the higher flow demand for PM.
More importantly, since this tr-ansaction is unsteril-
ized, it causes the U.S. money supply to rise and the
German money supply to fall. If large enough, this
intervention has twopotential effects:atransient effect
on the current markets for the two currencies and a
permanent effect on expected future relative inflation
rates. Other things equal, the resulting excess supply of
U.S. money in the United States and excess demand for
German money in Germany will cause the two coun-
tries’ money markets to clear at lower and higher-rates
ofinterest, respectively. This immediate, buttransitory,
effectwill cause the dollar to decline relative to the PM
as German assets temporarily have higher yields than
U.S. assets.
Whether this effecton the exchange rate is lasting or
transient, however, depends crucially on the expecta-
tions of investors holding U.S. and German assets. If
these expectations are unchanged, individuals holding
U.S. assets would sell them — driving up theiryields —
and buy German assets — depressing their yields —
thereby tending to offset the central bank’s actions.
That is, just as a single private individual in acompeti-
tive market can have no effect on asset prices by his
salesor purchases, so evencentral banks will not affect
asset prices unless their activity is substantial or their
actions affect market expectations.
This intervention may affect market expectations
about relative asset yields and prices if market partici-
pants interpret the expansion ofthe U.S.money supply
as an indicator of apermanent increase in the rate of
monetary growth planned by the Fed. Such expecta-
tions of further easing of U.S. monetary policy will
cause market participants to anticipate increases in
the rate of U.S. inflation relative to German inflation.
These expectations ofrelatively higher future U.S.infla-
tion will decrease the desire offoreigners to hold dol-
larssince they expect the dollar’s purchasing power to
continue to fall. Consequently, the PM value of the
dollar will depreciate at a rate equal to the difference
between the now higher anticipated rate ofinflation in
the United States and that in Germany.11
Ifthe intervention is sterilized, itsimmediate impact
is thesame as that forunsterilized intervention; that is,
it generates a temporary increase in the flow demand
for PM. The net effect of this sterilized intervention is
simply that private portfolios will contain more dollar-
denominated and fewer PM-denominated securities;
neither country’s money supply will be affected. Con-
sequently, it is not clearwhat lasting impact this type of
intervention will have on the PM/dollar exchange rate.
Because sterilized intervention entails asubstitution
ofdollar-denominated securities forPM-denominated
ones, however-, the exchange rate will be permanently
affectedonly ifthe investors view domestic and foreign
securities as being imperfect substitutes. Ifthis is the
case, investors will be unwilling to hold the new port-
folio at unchanged exchange and interest rates. In fact,
at the original exchange and interest rates, an excess
demand for PM-denominated securities will arise.
Consequently, investors will attempt to acquire addi-
tional PM-denominated securities in order- to retur-n
their portfolios to the desired proportion of dollar’-
denominated securities, ther-eby placing downward
pressure on the PM value of the dollar.
If investors consider these securities to be perfect
substitutes, on the other hand, no change in either the
“This discussion is oversimplified in that it isolates onlytwo curren-
cies and the exchange rate between them. In the real world, there
are numerous currencies and exchange rates. Attemptstoaffect the
exchange rate between any pair ofcurrencies necessarily affect not
only the exchange rate between this pair, but all other exchange
rates as well. Consequently, intervention to move one exchange
rate in a desirable direction or to calm fluctuations in that exchange
rate may cause another exchange rate to move in an undesirable
direction or to become morevolatile.
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exchange rate or in interest rates will be necessary to
motivate investors to hold this portfolio. In summary,
when two domestic money supplies have been un-
affected by an intervention activity, the intervention
can have a permanent impact on the exchange rate




The foregoing discussion has emphasized that the
relationship between domestic monetary policy and
intervention depends on whether the intervention is
sterilized. Pomestic monetary policy cannot be con-
ducted independently of unsterilized intervention
since, as discussed above, it is tantamount toconduct-
ing monetary policy through foreign exchange market
operations. Thus, the exchange rate is a third alterna-
tive monetary target variable to those more frequently
considered — namely, monetary aggregates or interest
rates.
Because there can be only one monetary policy
stance, the role of unsterilized intervention depends
crucially on the importance that policymakers place
on the exchange rate as an objective for monetary
policy. In particular, the use of unsterilized interven-
tion necessarily implies that the monetary authority
places relatively more importance on reducing the
risks and real economic disturbances associated with
exchange rate movements than achieving domestic
tar-gets for- inflation and unemployment. The manip-
ulation of monetary policy to achieve exchange rate
objectives inevitably will conflict — occasionally or
frequently — with the policy stance required to
achieve these domestic objectives.
Fur-thermore, exchange rate movements may be
motivated not only by changes in the desire to hold
domestic currency which probably should be offset
by changes in the domestic money supply), but also by
ahost of other factors, especially the policies followed
by foreign policymakers. Pirecting domestic monetary
policy at an excharlge rate target, then, subjects the
domestic economy to disturbances from both domes-
tic and foreign sources. Consequently, the monetary
authority loses its ability to control its own money
supply independently of foreign events.
The desire to influence exchange r-ate movements
wrthout losing control ofthe domestic money supply is
the primary motivation for using sterilized interven-
tion. Whether a monetary authority can separ-ate cx-
change rate management from money stock control,
however, depends on whether certain conditions are
met. First, international assets (including currencies)
must be imperfect substitutes. Second, the magnitude
of sterilized intervention undertaken must be large
enough — given the degree of imperfect substitutabil-
ity — that market participants cannot undo this effect
by engaging in offsetting transactions.
SOME EVIDENCE ON THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERVENTION
Assessing the efficacy of intervention is difficult be-
cause data on central bank intervention are not made
available;in contr-ast to domestic central bank transac-
tions, which are reported ingreat detail, international
transactions are reported only in a non-systematic,
summary form. Three pieces of qualitative evidence,
however, can be used to gauge the likely effectiveness
of intervention. The first is an indirect assessment
obtained byconsidering adomestic policy experiment,
somewhat analogous to sterilized intervention, which
occurred in the early 1960s. The second is an assess-
ment of the potential for the U.S. tnonetary authorities
to influence the foreign exchange market by compar-
ingthe volume of assets and the rate oftransactions in
these markets by private investor’s with the monetary
authority’s holdings and activities. The third is adirect
assessment of U.S. and other central bank intervention
activity revealed inaworking group study prepared for
the 1983 Williamsburg Economic Summit Meeting.
An Analogous Policy: Operalion Twist
A historical example of a domestic policy experi-
ment by the Federal Reserve that is similar to sterilized
intervention is Operation Twist.” Puring 1961-432, the
Federal Reserve sold short-term U.S. securities and
used the proceeds to buy long-term U.S. securities; as
with sterilized intervention, the transactions were
offsetting so that the money supply was unchanged.
‘rhe resulting increase in short-term gover-nment
securities and the concomitant decline in long-term
government securities in private portfolios were in-
tended to raise the yield on short-term securities and
lower the yield on long-term securities, thus, twist-
ing” the term structure.12
In this effort, thefirst condition discussed above was
met — namely, long-term securities bear higher- in-
terest rates than short-term securities, and, thus, the
‘2See Markiel (1966), pp. 219—43.
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two assets are imperfect substitutes. Yet, the effort is
generally judged to have failed primarily because the
policy was not executed vigorously enough.13 The
point (as emphasized by Malkiel) is that acentral bank
policy of affectingthe term structure for interest rates
depends, for its effectiveness, on two points: the
bank’s ability to affect significantly the r’elative supplies
ofshort- and long-term financial assets and its willing-
ness to do so. In this case of intervention in domestic
asset markets, the extent of theactivity was inadequate
to have any significant impact.
Similarly,when sterilized intervention in foreignex-
change markets is undertaken, theimmediate distribu-
13As Johnson (1963), cited in Malkiel, p. 234, concludes:
Whatever might have been expected of this policy. .. itwas not in fact
pursued in any effecrive sense. As a result primarily of Treasuryfund-
ing operations, the maturiryof the debr in rhehands of the publichas in
fact been lengthened appreciably, instead of shorlened as the policy
would require.
lion of currencies and securities denominated in those
currencies is altered; two market activities, however-,
are thereby set in motion that tend to undo any
impact on relative interest ratesand the exchange rate.
First, private entities — banks, primarily, but also indi-
vidual traders — sell or buy securities denominated in
the currencies that have been affected. Second, actual
cun-ency flowsand options to buy orsell currencies or
forward contracts are changed. Thus, unless the cen-
tral bank is prepared to take sufficient actions to alter
tnarket expectations, it will be unlikely to affect the
exchange rates by sterilized intervention.
The Potential: Foreign Asset Holdings
and the Size of the U.S~Foreign
Exchange Market
The likelihood that intervention can affect exchange
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Chart 2
Relative Investment Flows into Foreign Assets
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central bank for’eign asset holdings or central bank
activity and the size of markets for foreign exchange.
The relevance offoreign asset holdings is that changing
any single exchange t-ate changes the price of these
assets in two or’ more currencies. Consequently, ex-
change rate movements caused by intervention may be
presumed to induce shifts in desired portfolios of
assets — that is, flows of asset sales and purchases
that tend to offset such changes.
Chart I shows the stocks of foreign assets held by
U.S. individuals and institutions, U.S. assets held by
private foreigners, and the foreign reserves (minus
gold) of the U.S. Federal Reserve System and the Trea-
sury. It is clear that private investors hold a much
lar-gershare of assets traded in international markets
than do the Fed and the U.S. Treasury. Consequently,
to change the pnce at which these assets are valued
would require very aggressive intervention.
Many have argued that the primary impact of in-
tervention is on the flow demands for the currencies
involved. If so, one should compare the flowsof trans-
actions in these markets rather- than asset holdings.t4
From this perspective, consider chart 2—transactions
in international markets. Comparing the rate of ac-
‘4This leaves aside, for the moment, theindirect effect ofintervention
throughchanges in expectations offuture central bank policy,which









[2Pasitive values are purchases of dallars.
NOTE, Direct investment data priar to 1977 do not reflect 1977 benchmark revision.
23FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS MAY 1984
\,~ :~c,~J ,~s, ~~ t~L ‘~,
, I 4S , ~ L~’ ~ I~\ ~ ~Lcy <‘~ ‘ ~L/‘ ,~i \‘~‘f”~
~ ~ ttlp~~er ‘IL ~ “ ~ .)~ :: ~ ~ ~~Møø ~ c~ ~~ ~ —:~1& ~
~ ~r~c:~ ‘5 ~s ~ ~ ~Jwk~w. ~A$fl~ØL/ >
~ ~~ ~ ‘S ,, L5
,,,/cLv~ ~H ~ ~&, /s.~ ‘<K ~“P’’ ‘L’ LA “ , ‘\,</~~~/\/\
Ii
,,sc /r ~‘ ~ ~ — /4 “ ~ c~ ‘~ ~ ~,, ~‘ 7 <‘~S,Pz ~~ ~ ./ — ~4k ~~ ,, ~/,4. ~
,. C / ,, ~ c.~ ~N C~z .~, L <~ ~‘ & ~s,
,~.‘ ~
5~
k .~ 4 ,,~Lt ~ ~ ‘s/ ~ “ ‘/
,~ ~ ~‘ .~ ~4~\ ~ ~ ~ ~, ~, I 4’~~ ‘~‘ r “ ~ ~ ‘7 V
C’. ~ k..V.’ ,.t , L’ <VL .,,~\ ‘S. ., ‘. ~~ ..VV//\~
~V&V~
1 ~ ~‘ ,. VV c<:~ <~ ~ /~ ~ Vs ~‘ ‘~ ‘ ~ ~ L~ ,~ ~
~~:rt~~t Tff%~flV1~i~t rw ~ ~~ V
.7,. ~ ~. ~ ~. ,\ V ~ ,~ &V •.u~aL V ~ ‘S~<” ~ ,.~
:1 ; ~ ~ .‘ : V ~ N
/V ~ V V1~lS~$o: ~j~:EIV ~ ~rnNItm~~~ V~ ~ Mi
N~:: ~ ~: NV N
:,:~::~ ~ ‘~ ~ VN>
V~1t~V~ ~: !t~L ~ ~,N
quisition offoreign assets by U.S. investors with the rate
ofintervention by U.S. monetary authorities (combined
U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve) clearly demon-
strates that the private U.S. investment activity on
an annual basis swamps that of the authorities, and,
in fact, so has the rate of purchase of U.S. assets by
foreigners in recent years.
Another, perhaps even more relevant. comparison
would be the transaction rates over intervals shorter
than a year. That is, it might be argued that chart 2
shows net figures overan irrelevantly long time period:
what matters is the gross volume of transactions in,
say, amonth or a day. From this perspective, consider
the data in table 1, which r-epor-ts the turnover statistics
for U.S. banks engaging in significant volumes offoreign
currency transactions.55 As the table shows, both the
volume in the observed month) per bank and the
number of banks with significant involvement in for-
eign currency markets have risen dramatically since
1977.The total volume has risen sevenfold, comprising
a quadrupling in the per-bank volume indicated by
the changes in the activity of the banks originally sur—
veyed in 1977) and a tripling from 44 to 119) of the
number of banks actively participating in foreign cur-
‘tThe data in the first halfof table 1 are from periodic surveys of U.S.
banks that engage in significant foreign exchange market transac-
tions.These surveys are conductedby the Federal Reserve Bank of
NewYork. Formore details about these surveys, seeRevey (1981).
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rency markets. Ifthe volume in contracts during April
1983 is expressed in a daily aver-age form, themarket in
U.S. banks alone is about $33.5 billion. Almost two-
thirds of these contracts are spot currency exchanges.
In comparison, the table also reports the combined
Federal Reserve-U.S. Treasury intervention for the full
six-month period containing each of the three survey
dates alongwith representative episodes ofsignificant
US. intervention. As even a cursory review ofthe data
reveals, U.S. intervention activity has been trivial rela-
tive to the volume of bank trading in currencies; only
rarely has intervention been morn than a tiny fraction
oftheprivate marketvolume. Consequently, thenotion
that the central bank has influenced the market price
ofcurrencies — their exchange rate—purely byaffect-
ing the flow volume of exchange is inconsistent with
the recent record.
Some Direct Evidence: Report ofthe
Working Group on Exchange
Market Intervention
Central bank intervention — whether in domestic
asset markets orinternational currency markets—can
be effective only if the market is convinced that the
monetary authority isboth able andwilling to affectthe
flows of transactions. In view of the growing size of
private currency markets and the conflict with domes-
tic inflation policies that effective intervention would
require, such an effect on market expectations also
seems to be beyond the grasp of the U.S. authorities.
Support forthis conclusion is provided bythe study
of exchange market intervention conducted by the
working group established at theVersailles Summit in
I9sz.~~ This report is especially significant since it
represents the most comprehensive analysis of the
motives, methods and impacts of central bank inter-
vention in foreign exchange markets that has been
conducted using actual intervention data — data un-
available to most researcher-s.
While the working gi-oup found that sterilized in-
tervention is not totally ineffective, its effect was much
smaller than that of unsterilized intervention.’7 Fur-
thermol-e, the group found that intervention could he
effective in the face ofpersistent mar-ket pr-essures onl
if it was supported by complementary changes in
‘6fleport of the Working Group on Exchange Market Intervention




Additional support, at least for Germany, is provided by Obstfeld
(1983). pp. 184—85, as he concludes that:
domestic policy, especially monetary policy. When in-
consistencies have arisen between domestic policy
and exchange rate objectives, the group found that
intervention (counter to the goals of domestic policy)
was frequently useless and even counterproductive in
the absence of supportive domestic policy. Conse-
quently, the ministers, in their statement released with
the working group’s report, downplayed the impor-
tance of sterilized intervention as a separate policy
tool:
We have reached agreement [that), under the presenr
circumstances, the role of [sterilizedl intervention can
only be limited. -. -Intervention will normally be useful
only when complementing and supporting other
policies 58
CONCLUSION
Most discussions ofthe effectiveness ofcentral bank
intervention focus on expectations of market partici-
pants and how intervention alters them. Yet, evenifthe
central bank is capable ofaltering market expectations
about its future policies, such a change can be brought
about only ifthe market is convinced that other policy
goals — the domestic inflation rate, level of interest
rates, stability of domestic credit markets, etc. — are
subordinate to exchange rate manipulation. For the
United States, at least, such apolicy stance would not
be credible. Thus, the efficacy of exchange rate in-
tervention would seem to be diminished greatly by the
public’s knowledge of the primacy of other monetary
policy objectives.19
The model’s verdict was that the Bundesbank has little if any power to
influence the exchange rare over that lime span [one month] without
altering currentor expectedfuture money-market conditions [i.e., with-
out conducting unsterilized intervention].
ltStatement on the Report of the Working Group on Exchange Market
Intervention (1983), p. 2.
‘0Consider again the view of former Bundesbank President Em-
minger (Bank for International Settlements [1982j. pp. 5—8):
To sum up: Exchange rare policies cover a wide spectrum: trom simply
‘having a view’ on the exchange rate to smoothing out disorderly
conditions’ to avoidingexcesses which are palpablyfar out of line with
fundamentals and are disturbing.Theinstruments range from interven-
tion to interest rate policy, general monetary and other economic
policies, and to official borrowing or lending.
There is also a wide spectrumin the useofsuchpolicies from country to
country. This is partly a question of size. For the United States, there is
quite certainly no other solution but free floating. The problems of a
more active exchange rate policy are mainly relevant br middle-sized
industrial countries, It is therefore natural and understandable that the
attitude lowards exchange rate policy differs between the United
States and other industrial countries.
There is also another important difference, which makes the United
States a specialcase. Other industrial countries usually lake the dollar
us yardstick and interveneagainstthe dollar. For the United States,it is
more difficulttodecide againstwhich individual currenciesthey should
measure the value of their currency, and against which to intervene in
case of need. This is one of the several problemson which the oft-
requested joint and concerted intervention policy wouldfounder.
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